Discussion

There is no specific regulation that addresses protection requirements for electrical and electronic systems from HIRF. Increased power levels from ground-based radio transmitters and the growing use of sensitive electrical and electronic systems to command and control airplanes have made it necessary to provide adequate protection.

To ensure that a level of safety is achieved equivalent to that intended by the regulations incorporated by reference, special conditions are issued for the Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50, which would require that new technology electrical and electronic systems, such as the EFIS, etc., be designed and installed to preclude component damage and interruption of function due to both the direct and indirect effects of HIRF.

High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

With the trend toward increased power levels from ground-based transmitters, plus the advent of space and satellite communications, coupled with electronic command and control of the airplane, the immunity of critical digital avionics systems to HIFR must be established.

It is not possible to precisely define the HIRF to which the airplane will be exposed in service. There is also uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling of electromagnetic energy to cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined. Based on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF emitters, an adequate level of protection exists when compliance with the HIRF protection special condition is shown with either paragraphs 1 or 2 below:

1. A minimum threat of 100 volts per meter peak electric field strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz.

a. The threat must be applied to the system elements and their associated wiring harnesses without the benefit of airframe shielding.

b. Demonstration of this level of protection is established through system tests and analysis.

2. A threat external to the airframe of the following field strengths for the frequency ranges indicated.

Frequency	Peak (V/M)	Average (V/M)
10 KHz–100 KHz	50	50
100 KHz–500 KHz	60	60
500 KHz–2000 KHz	70	70
2 MHz–30 MHz	200	200
30 MHz–100 MHz	30	30
100 MHz–200 MHz	150	33
200 MHz–400 MHz	70	70
400 MHz–700 MHz	4,020	935
700 MHz–1000 MHz	1,700	170
1 GHz–2 GHz	5,000	990
2 GHz–4 GHz	6,680	840
4 GHz–6 GHz	6,850	310
6 GHz–8 GHz	3,600	670
8 GHz–12 GHz	3,500	1,270
12 GHz–18 GHz	3,500	360
18 GHz–40 GHz	2,100	750

As discussed above, these special conditions would be applicable initially to the Garrett Aviation Services modified Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50. Should Garrett Aviation Services apply at a later date for a change to the supplemental type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain design features on the Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the manufacturer who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions for this airplane has been subjected to the notice and comment procedure in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions immediately. Therefore, these special conditions are being made effective upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation, safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, the following special conditions are issued as part of the supplemental type certification basis for the Garrett Aviation Services modified Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 series airplanes.

1. *Protection from Unwanted Effects of High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF).* Each electrical and electronic system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capability of these systems to perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high-intensity radiated fields.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies: *Critical Functions.* Functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 21, 1996.

Norman B. Martenson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, ANM–100.

[FR Doc. 96–13426 Filed 5–28–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96–NM–94–AD; Amendment 39–9635; AD 96–11–10]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Ltd., Model 1125 Westwind Astra Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain IAI, Ltd., Model 1125 Westwind Astra series airplanes. This action requires a visual inspection for clearance between the hydraulic lines/vacuum lines and the electrical wire bundles, and repair or replacement of damaged lines or wire bundles with serviceable parts. This AD also requires installation of neoprene hose around the affected hydraulic lines and vacuum lines. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that chafing was found on a hydraulic line. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such chafing, which could

result in leakage of hydraulic fluid and subsequent loss of one of the two hydraulic systems.

DATES: Effective June 13, 1996.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June 13, 1996.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 29, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96–NM–94–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Technical Publications, Astra Jet Corporation, 77 McCullough Drive, Suite 11, New Castle, Delaware 19720. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (206) 227–2141; fax (206) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Civil Aviation Administration of Israel (CAAI), which is the airworthiness authority for Israel, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on certain Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Ltd., Model 1125 Westwind Astra series airplanes. The CAAI advises that it received a report indicating that chafing was found on a hydraulic line located at fuselage station 383.00. This chafing was the result of an electrical wire bundle sagging and coming in contact with the hydraulic lines in the area. Chafing of a hydraulic line can result in leakage of hydraulic fluid. This condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of one of the two hydraulic systems.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

Astra Jet has issued Service Bulletin SB 1125–29–139, dated August 2, 1995, which describes procedures for a visual inspection for clearance between the hydraulic lines/vacuum lines and the electrical wire bundles, and repair or replacement of damaged lines or wire bundles with serviceable parts. The service bulletin also describes procedures for installation of neoprene hose around the affected hydraulic lines and vacuum lines. Accomplishment of the installation will protect the hydraulic lines located at fuselage station 383.00 from possible chafing. The CAAI classified this service bulletin as mandatory and issued Israeli AD No. 96–19, dated February 8, 1996, in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in Israel.

FAA's Conclusions

This airplane model is manufactured in Israel and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the CAAI has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the CAAI, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Explanation of Requirements of Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered in the United States, this AD is being issued to prevent chafing of the hydraulic lines, which could result in leakage of hydraulic fluid and subsequent loss of one of the two hydraulic systems. This AD requires a visual inspection for clearance between the hydraulic lines/vacuum lines and the electrical wire bundles, and repair or replacement of damaged lines or wire bundles with serviceable parts. This AD also requires installation of neoprene hose around the affected hydraulic lines and vacuum lines. The actions are required to be accomplished in accordance with the service bulletin described previously.

Determination of Rule's Effective Date

Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified under the caption **ADDRESSES**. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ''Comments to Docket Number 96–NM–94–AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, and that it is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES.**

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

96–11–10 Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Ltd.: Amendment 39–9635. Docket 96–NM–94–AD.

Applicability: Model 1125 Westwind Astra series airplanes, serial numbers 004 through 076 inclusive; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent chafing of the hydraulic lines, which could result in leakage of hydraulic fluid and subsequent loss of one of the two hydraulic systems, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD in accordance with Astra Jet Service Bulletin SB 1125–29–139, dated August 2, 1995.

(1) Perform a visual inspection for clearance between the hydraulic lines/vacuum lines and the electrical wire bundles at fuselage station 383.00, in accordance with the service bulletin. Prior to further flight, repair or replace any damaged line or wire bundle with a serviceable part in accordance with the service bulletin.

(2) Install neoprene hose around the affected hydraulic lines and vacuum lines in accordance with the service bulletin.

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM–113.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM–113.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(d) The actions shall be done in accordance with Astra Jet Service Bulletin SB 1125–29–139, dated August 2, 1995. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Technical Publications, Astra Jet Corporation, 77 McCullough Drive, Suite 11, New Castle, Delaware 19720. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(e) This amendment becomes effective on June 13, 1996.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 20, 1996.

James V. Devany,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–13230 Filed 5–28 –96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–145–AD; Amendment 39–9636; AD 96–11–11]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9 series airplanes, that requires inspection(s) to detect cracking in the nose skin of the fuselage, and various follow-on actions. This amendment also provides for an optional modification, which would defer certain repetitive inspections, if no cracking is detected. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking in the upper nose skin of the fuselage due to fatigue. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue-related cracking, which could compromise the structural integrity of the airplane.

DATES: Effective July 3, 1996.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of July 3, 1996.

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Technical Publications Business Administration, Department C1–L51 (2–60). This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron Atmur, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–120L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712; telephone (310) 627–5224; fax (310) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1996 (61 FR 1301). That action proposed to require inspection(s) to detect cracking in the nose skin of the fuselage, and various follow-on actions. That action also proposed a provision for an optional modification, which would defer certain repetitive inspections, if no cracking is detected.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

Support for the Proposal

Two commenters support the proposed rule.

Request to Extend the Compliance Time

One commenter requests that the ''grace period'' of the compliance time for the accomplishment of the high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection be extended from the proposed 3,000 landings to 4,000 landings. This will allow the HFEC