FCC Web Documents citing 1.359
- http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-00-366A1_Erratum.pdf
- ExclusiveAccessProvisionsinExistingContracts FCC00-366 163. Weseekcommentonwhetherweshouldprohibitcarriersfromenforcingexclusive accessprovisionsinexistingcontractsineithercommercialorresidentialMTEs.AT&Thasarguedthat forlocalcompetitiontothriveamongtelecommunicationscarriersincommercialMTEs,buildingowners mustbepermittedtoterminatetheirexistingexclusivecontractsandseeknewrelationshipswith competingcarriers.353Moreover,AT&TarguesthattheCommissionhasauthoritytovoidexclusive contractsthatarecurrentlyineffect.354 164. WerecognizethattheCommissionhaspreviouslyexerciseditsauthoritytomodify provisionsofprivatecontractswhennecessarytoservethepublicinterest.355AstheCommission explainedinour ExpandedInterconnectionOrder,thebenefitofthisapproachisthatitallows"an incumbentprovider'sestablishedcustomerstoconsidertakingservicefromanewentrant.,,356We recognize,though,thatthemodificationofexistingexclusivecontractsbytheCommissionwouldhavea significanteffectontheinvestmentinterestsofthosebuildingownersandcarriersthathaveenteredinto suchcontracts.Thus,weareinclinedtoproceedcautiouslyinthisarea.Weseekcommentonwhether prohibitingcarriersfromenforcingaccessprovisionsinexistingcontractsineithercommercialor residentialMTEsisnecessarytoensurethatcustomersobtainthebenefitsofthemorecompetitiveaccess environmentenvisionedinthe1996Act.Wealsoseekcommentonwhether,inlieuofanimmediate prohibitionontheenforcementofexclusiveaccessprovisionsinexistingcontracts,weshouldphaseout suchprovisionsbyestablishingafutureterminationdatefortheseprovisions.Weseekcommenton whatterminationdateshouldbeadoptediftheCommissionweretotakesuchaction. C. PreferentialMarketingAgreementsandOtherPreferentialArrangements 165. Asnotedabove,severalcommentersbrieflyaddressvariouspreferentialbuilding ownerlLECrelationships,suchasexclusivemarketingarrangementsorbonusesgivenbylandlordsto tenantswhosubscribetotheservicesofparticularcompetitiveLECs.Generally,competitiveLECs arguethat,likeexclusivecontracts,suchpreferentialarrangementsshouldnotbepermitted.357Qwest notes,inparticular,that"[a]narrangementthatisnottechnically'exclusive'mayinfacthavethe practicaleffectofbeingexclusive,ifthebuildingownerrefusestomakethesamearrangementavailable 35',See,e.g.,AT&TCommentsat28. 354 The Commissionhasthepowertoprescribeachangeincontractrateswhenit[mdsthemtobeunlawfulandto modifyotherprovisionsofprivatecontractswhennecessarytoservethepublicinterest.AT&TCommentsat27 (citing WesternUnionTelegraphCo.v.FCC,815F.2d1495,1501(D.C.Cir.1987».TheCommissionpreviously hasexercisedthatauthoritytopermitcustomersto"terminate"their"servicearrangements"withacarrier"without beingcontractuallyliableforsuchtermination."AT&TCommentsat26-27(citingCompetitionintheInterstate InterexchangeMarketplace, MemorandumOpinion&OrderonReconsideration,10FCCRcd4421, 'Ii5n.15 (1995»;seealsoCompetitionintheInterstateInterexchangeMarketplace,Report&Order,6FCCRcd5880, 'Ii151 (1991). 355 ExpandedInterconnectionwithLocalTelephoneCompanyFacilities, MemorandumOpinionandOrder,9FCC Rcd5154, 'Ii197(1994)(ExpandedInterconnectionOrder). 357 WinStarCommentsat25(discussingbothexclusivecontractsandpreferencesandarguingthattheydonot promotecompetition);QwestReplyCommentsat11. 23053 FederalCommunicationsCommission FCC00-366 toothercarriers.,,358Incontrast,othercommentersarguethatpreferentialarrangementsareoften beneficia1.359Forexample,SBCassertsthat,inexchangeforexclusivemarketingandadvertising services,LECsmayofferconsideration,"suchasthepaymentofcommissionsto...propertyownersand discountedorpackagedservicesfortheirtenants,,,360andthattheresultingpackagescanbebeneficialto bothbuildingownersandtenants.OptelechoesSBC'sviewandurgesthatanyCommissionaction prohibitingexclusivemarketingagreements"mayundermineconcessionsgiventoMDUresidents (e.g., lowerrates)inexchangeformarketingservicesattheMDU.,,36J Optelalsoassertsthatthese arrangementsarenotanticompetitive,particularlywhentheyinvolvecarriersthatlackmarketpower.362 166. Notably,severalstateshavepromulgatedruleseitherrequiringthatthetermsofany preferentialarrangementbedisclosedtotenantsorprohibitingpreferentialarrangementsaltogether.363In particular,theMassachusettsDepartmentofTelecommunicationsandEnergyhasnotedthatmarketing agreements,whichitdefinesascontractsinwhichabuildingowner"receivescompensationfroma serviceproviderforallowingittomarketitsservicestotenantsorreceivecompensationforeachnew tenantthatbecomesacustomeroftheserviceprovider"havethe"potentialtoencouragediscriminatory behavior.,,364Asaresult,inthatstate,theexistenceandtermsofanymarketingagreementsmustbe disclosedtotenants.Also,inConnecticut,contractsforbuildingaccessbetweentelecommunications providersandbuildingownerscannotinclude"[a]nytermthatdiscriminatesinfavorofanyone telecommunicationsserviceproviderwithrespecttotheprovisionofaccessorcompensation requested.,,365 167. Asapreliminarymatter,wenotethatpreferentialarrangementsoftenariseincontextsin whichabuildingownerhasafinancialinterestinatelecommunicationscarrier.Forexample,itisour understandingthatbuildingLECsoftenenterintoexclusivemarketingorotherpreferentialarrangements withtheirbuildingownerinvestors.Preferentialarrangementsarenot,however,necessarilylimitedto thiscontext.366Weseekcommentonthetypesofpreferentialarrangementsthatexistandthecontextsin whichtheyoccur. 358QwestReplyCommentsat11.Althoughwehavealreadyprohibiteddefactoexclusivecontracts,seesuprapara. 37,weseekcommentonwhetherweshouldprohibitpreferentialarrangementsthatfallshortofbeingconsideredde facto contracts. 359SBCCommentsat7(arguingthat,whileexclusiveaccesscontractsareanti-competitive,exclusivemarketingor advertisingcontracts"arevalidbusinesstools");OptelCommentsat18;seealsoSBCReplyCommentsat9-11. 360SBCCommentsat7. 361OptelCommentsat18. 362Id. 363 See,e.g..MassachusettsNondiscriminatoryAccessOrder;NebraskaMDUOrder. 364 MassachusettsNondiscriminatoryAccessOrder at30. '65 ,Conn.Gen.Stats.Ann. §16-2471-6(a)(6)(1997). 366 See LetterfromKathleenQ.Abernathy,VicePresident,BroadBandOffice,toMagalieRomanSalas,Secretary, FCC,datedApril13,2000(enclosinghandoutfromApril13,2000expartemeetingwithCommercialWireless Divisionstaff);LetterfromJosephM.Sandri,Jr.,WinStarCommunications,Inc.,toMagalieRomanSalas, Secretary,FCC,datedNovember22,1999. 23054 FederalCommunicationsCommission FCC00-366 168. Totheextentanyarrangementeffectivelyrestrictsapremisesownerfromproviding accesstoothertelecommunicationsserviceproviders,itisprohibitedundertherulesweadopttoday. HoweverbecausebuildingLECshaveonlyrecentlyemergedaslocaltelecommunicationsservice providers,andbecausewehavereceivedfewcommentsonthisissueingeneral,wehavedecidednotto addresspreferentialarrangementsgenerallyintheReportandOrder.Instead,weseekfurthercomment onwhether,andtowhatextent,theCommissionshouldregulatepreferentialarrangements.Specifically,
- http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-44A1.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-44A1.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-44A1.txt
- §§ 73.1943, 73.3526(e)(6), 73.3527(e)(5); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2002) (codifying the Commission's rules and requiring broadcaster disclosure of political issue ads, by expanding the criteria to purchases of broadcast time ``relating to any political matter of national importance.'' Compare New Section 0.418 and Amendment of Sections 0.417 (formerly in 0.406), 1.580 (formerly 1.359), and 1.594 (formerly in 1.362) of the Commission's Rules Relating to Inspection of Records, to Pre-Grant Procedures, and to Local Notice of Filing or of Designation for Hearing of Broadcast Applications, Report and Order, 4 R.R. 2d 1664, 1667-68 ¶ 11-12 (1965) (``1965 Public Inspection File Order'') (citing Commission Policy on Programming, Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En
- http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-44A3.doc http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-44A3.pdf http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-44A3.txt
- §§ 73.1943, 73.3526(e)(6), 73.3527(e)(5); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2002) (codifying the Commission's rules and requiring broadcaster disclosure of political issue ads, by expanding the criteria to purchases of broadcast time ``relating to any political matter of national importance.'' Compare New Section 0.418 and Amendment of Sections 0.417 (formerly in 0.406), 1.580 (formerly 1.359), and 1.594 (formerly in 1.362) of the Commission's Rules Relating to Inspection of Records, to Pre-Grant Procedures, and to Local Notice of Filing or of Designation for Hearing of Broadcast Applications, Report and Order, 4 R.R. 2d 1664, 1667-68 ¶ 11-12 (1965) (``1965 Public Inspection File Order'') (citing Commission Policy on Programming, Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En
- http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Public_Notices/2000/da000517.doc
- submitted the following projections of demand and administrative expenses for the second quarter of 2000: ($ millions) Program Projected Program Support Admin. Expenses Application of Balance From Prior Period Application of Interest Income Application of Periodic True-Ups Total Program Collection Schools and Libraries 555.231 7.269 (50.438) (13.909) (17.221) 480.932 Rural Health Care 3.344 0.861 (0.000) (0.009) (0.094) 4.102 High-Cost 487.689 1.359 (0.000) (0.600) 6.562 495.010 Low Income 125.705 0.346 (0.000) (0.530) 0.841 126.362 TOTAL 1171.969 9.835 (50.438) (15.048) (9.912) 1106.406 USAC reports that, based on current data, it does not believe that it will need to disburse the full amount of funds that it was authorized to collect for the first year of the schools and libraries program. Specifically, USAC estimates
- http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/Intl/4361-f02.pdf
- $162,82585.3 0.0 0.514.2 0.0 3,627,16512.922.3 1.613.649.6 Burundi $118,979 0.946.0 1.214.837.0 $0 $0 605,325 0.241.9 1.927.128.8 Cameroon $9,077,20532.326.4 1.017.822.6 $274,38845.7 0.0 0.054.3 0.0 $371,39889.3 0.2 0.8 9.7 0.0 30,501,92412.527.2 1.425.033.8 Canary Island $22 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0100.0 $0 $0 718 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0100.0 Cape Verde $2,630,46652.4 4.3 1.832.7 8.7 $131,74458.9 0.0 0.041.1 0.0 $33,53497.9 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 17,445,86332.3 2.6 1.359.0 4.8 Central African Republic $259,386 0.075.5 1.811.111.6 $10,311 0.0 0.0 0.0100.0 0.0 $2,033 0.0 0.0 7.592.5 0.0 477,438 0.026.7 6.243.124.1 Chad $243,219 0.174.6 1.8 7.615.8 $129 0.0 0.0100.0 0.0 0.0 $1,751 0.7 0.099.3 0.0 0.0 932,131 0.175.5 2.1 9.712.7 Comoros $102,162 0.029.7 1.825.043.6 $0 $27316.8 0.083.2 0.0 0.0 433,295 0.017.7 2.035.944.4 Congo $1,931,00514.8 3.4 0.269.412.3 $43,37453.6 0.0 0.046.2 0.3 $381,570